The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore in ‡uence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if e¤ort is observable, this can induce a ratchet e¤ect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little e¤ort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that they are of little ability. The e¤ect reduces overall e¤ort and increases equilibrium utility of the contestants when compared with two unrelated one-shot contests. It does, however, also introduce an allocative ine¢ ciency since sometimes a contestant with a low valuation wins.
Introduction
Contests or tournaments are ubiquitous. Examples include tournaments and, more generally, competition for advancement and promotion within …rms, rent seeking contests, R&D races, election races, and appropriative con ‡icts. In the last decades a large literature on contests has been developed. 1 However, little is known about repeated contests with asymmetric information. In many real world applications, the same contestants meet repeatedly in contests. For example, in many …rms there are contests for becoming "employee of the month", and in many universities there are "teacher of the year"awards. Moreover, important representative jobs like chairman of a political organization are typically held only for a limited time. Thus, the competition for getting such a job has the character of a repeated contest.
Rent-seeking contests are sometimes repeated, too. This paper begins the study of repeated contests with asymmetric information with a stylized model of an imperfectly discriminating contest in the tradition of Tullock (1980) . Two contestants compete in a contest which is repeated once. They observe the e¤ort chosen by the rival in the …rst round before deciding on their own e¤ort in the second round. The contestants have private information about how much they value winning, or about their abilities. Formally, I assume that each contestant either has a high or a low valuation, where the low valuation is zero. The model describes situations where the contestants do not know whether they face an active competitor or not, as in Myerson and Wärneryd (2006) , Münster (2006) , and Lim and Matros (2007) . The valuations of the contestants are independent, but constant over time. Of course, this highly stylized 1 This literature has been developed in several di¤erent …elds. Excellent surveys are available. Rosen (1988) and Konrad (2007) are on contests generally. Lazear (1995) includes a chapter on labor market tournaments. See Nitzan (1994) on rent-seeking, and Baye and Hoppe (2003) on the strategic equivalence between rent-seeking contests and R&D races. Recent work on research tournaments includes Che and Gale (2003) and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) . Szymanski (2003) surveys the design of sport tournaments. Skaperdas (2003) and Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2006) review the economic literature on appropriative con ‡ict. In auction theory, there is a closely related literature on all pay auctions (in the language of contest theory, an all pay auction is a perfectly discriminating contest), see Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) . framework precludes consideration of many interesting topics. On the other hand, it yields a tractable model which leads to important insights into the e¤ects that are present in repeated contests with asymmetric information.
The main insight is that there can be a ratchet e¤ect in repeated contests: contestants with a high ability or a high valuation sometimes put in little e¤ort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that their ability is low -they are sandbagging. This reduces the resources spent in the contest. With regard to labor markets, this points to drawback of relative performance compensation schemes. Moreover, sandbagging introduces an allocative ine¢ ciency since now a contestant with a low valuation sometimes wins in round one. However, I show that the net e¤ect is bene…cial for the contestants.
Applied to rent-seeking, this means that, when rent-seeking activities are viewed as pure waste from a social point of view, rent dissipation is smaller. Thus, a repeated contest can actually be used to reduce the welfare loss due to rent-seeking. On the other hand, when rent-seeking activities are viewed as pure transfers, allocative e¢ ciency is the only welfare criterium and therefore the repeated contest leads to higher welfare losses.
I show that there will be sandbagging in equilibrium if, and only if, the proportion of low valuation contestants is low. Otherwise, in equilibrium expected e¤ort and rent dissipation are like those in two unrelated one shot contests with asymmetric information.
As a robustness check, I also consider the case of a perfectly discriminating contest (an all pay auction). Results are qualitatively similar.
Contests with asymmetric information have been studied by Hurley and Shogren (1998a) , who model one sided asymmetric information, and by Hurley and Shogren (1998b) and Malueg and Yates (2004) who look at two sided asymmetric information. Wärneryd (2003) is an interesting paper on the common value case. Myerson and Wärn-eryd (2006), Münster (2006) , and Lim and Matros (2007) study contests where the number of contestants is not known to the contestants. None of these papers deals with repeated contests. My paper is also related to several papers on multi-stage contests. Rosen (1986) studies a sequential elimination tournament, and Gradstein and Konrad (1999) compare a simultaneous contest with a sequential contest. In contrast to the present paper, these papers look at sequential elimination contests, where it is never the case that the same two contestants meet again in a later round. Most closely related to the present paper are Meyer (1991) and Meyer (1992) on the optimal design of a repeated contest between a pair of contestants, and Krähmer (2007) , Mehlum and Moene (2006) , and Amegashie (2006) on in…nitely repeated contests between two contestants. In these papers, information is symmetric. Amegashie (2007) also discusses implications for signaling in contests when there is asymmetric information. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) study an all-pay auction model of an elimination contest. They assume that the contestants who compete in a later round can not directly observe the e¤ort that their current rivals have chosen in an earlier round, thus abstracting away from the signaling issues at the heart of the present paper. In auction theory, the setup used by Jeitschko and Wolfstetter (2002) is close to my paper. My paper is also related to Hörner and Sahuget (2007) who study signaling in a dynamic auction. These papers study auctions with a deterministic allocation rule, whereas I look at an imperfectly discriminating contest, where there is some "noise" in the determination of the winner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple model of repeated contests with asymmetric information. Section 3 looks at the second round contest. Section 4 studies the repeated contest. As a robustness check, section 5 discusses the case of a perfectly discriminating contest (all pay auction).
The model
There are two contestants i = a; b and two rounds t = 1; 2: In each round, there is a prize to be won. There are two types of contestants. High valuation types value winning the prize with v > 0; while low valuation types have a valuation of zero. The low valuation types can also be thought of as having a budget cap of zero in each round, or in…nite bid cost (zero ability). Hence the model is also applicable to a situation where an ability or endowment is needed in order to be able to compete at all, and only some of the contestants have this ability or endowment. Denote the type of i by v i : Each contestant knows his own type but not the type of the other contestant. The valuations are independent across contestants but constant over time. In this model, a contestant does not know whether he faces any active rival, which is arguably a feature of many real world contests. Let x t i denote the e¤ort that contestant i chooses in round t: Contestant i wins in round t with probability
This contest success function is commonly used in the literature. Microeconomic underpinnings have been developed by Mortensen (1982) , Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) , and Fullerton and McAfee (1999) . For an axiomatization see Skaperdas (1996) . 2 In equation (1), it is assumed that a fair coin is ‡ipped if no contestant puts in any e¤ort. In some applications, it may be more natural to assume that a contestant cannot win if he chooses zero e¤ort, and hence p Qualitatively, all the results below hold in this case, too.
Contestants are risk neutral and there is no discounting. 3 The objective function of contestant i is given by
For notational convenience, denote the utility gained in round t by u
The timing of the game is as follows. First nature draws the types v a and v b independently from a population. The fraction of low valuation types in the population is 2 (0; 1) : Next each contestant learns his own type, but not the type of his rival. Then 2 In section 5 I consider an alternative speci…cation: the perfectly discriminating contest where contestant i wins round t with probability one if x t i > x t j : 3 Discounting would diminish the incentives to mislead opponents and thus increase the range of parameters where there is separation in round one. However, results would not change qualitatively. the …rst contest is played: the contestants simultaneously choose their …rst round e¤orts fa; bg ! X speci…es i's e¤ort in t = 2 as a function of i's type, e¤orts of both contestants in t = 1; and the winner in the …rst round. In addition to strategies, we also have to consider the beliefs of the contestants. In the …rst round, each contestant thinks that his opponent has a low valuation with probability : Concerning the second round, let a denote the probability 4 There are several other ways of dealing with the problem; all lead to similar concusions. (i) Following Blume and Heidhues (2006) , one could allow additional e¤orts such as 0 + ; which is identical to 0 except that 0 + wins, with probability one, against 0: (ii) Another alternative is to use an endogenous tie breaking rule, following Jackson et al. (2002) . The only change of (1) concerns the case where x 2 i = x 2 j = 0 : in case of a tie at zero in t = 2; the contestant with the higher value wins with probability one. One might object to this tie breaking rule since it depends on the valuations of the contestants, which are private information and thus not observable to the contest designer. But this di¢ culty can be solved by asking the contestants to report their types and breaking the tie according to the answers. Put more formally, in case of a tie at zero in t = 2; each contestant sends a message s i 2 f0; vg : If s i = v > s j = 0; then p 2 i = 1. Note that it is incentive compatible to report one's true type. There is one further subtelty concerning existence of optimal actions o¤ the equilibrium path which will be dealt with below (in footnote 9). that contestant a; after having observed x 1 b and the identity of the winner of round one, ascribes to the event that his opponent has a low valuation (v b = 0). Similarly, b is the probability b ascribes to v a = 0: I use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of strategies and beliefs for each contestant such that (i) strategies are sequentially optimal given beliefs and strategies of the opponent, and (ii) beliefs are updated according to Bayes'rule wherever possible.
Finally, I assume that social welfare is given by
The parameter captures a value judgement concerning how the e¤orts should be evaluated. In applications to rent-seeking, is the proportion of rent-seeking activities that are wasted from a social welfare point of view. 5 If = 1; rent-seeking is pure waste;
welfare coincides with the contestants'utility. On the other hand, in some situations it may be more reasonable to view rent-seeking activities as transfers to some third party.
The case = 0 captures the case of pure transfers. Then, allocative e¢ ciency is all that matters.
The second round contest
This section begins the analysis by studying the second round contest. Given beliefs a and b , the game in round two is identical to a one shot contest with two sided asymmetric information. This also provides a convenient benchmark for the behavior in the entire two stage game.
For a low valuation contestant, choosing x 2 i = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy. Thus, if a contestant with a high valuation believes that his opponent has a low valuation with 5 See, for example, Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996). probability one, he will not put in any e¤ort except ": Hence the high valuation type of contestant a solves max
where x 
The …rst order conditions are
The objective functions are concave, and hence the …rst order conditions are also su¢ cient for a maximum. Solving, we …nd that the e¤orts of the high valuation types are (i = a; b;
6 Note that similar arguments work in the alternative approaches described in footnote 4 aboe. In (i) the high valuation contestant chooses 0 + : In (ii), 0 with a message s i = v: Moreover, it can not be an equilibrium that x 2 i = 0 < x 2 j since j could achieve a higher payo¤ by choosing a lower e¤ort, as long as it is strictly positive.
If a < 1 and b < 1; these expressions are strictly positive and hence the constraints that
" do not bind.
Lemma 1 Given beliefs a < 1 and b < 1, there is a unique equilibrium in the second round of the game, where the e¤orts of the high valuation types are given by equation (4).
Expected utility of a high valuation type is
Some special cases are particularly interesting. For example, if a = b = 0; we are basically in a full information contest between two high valuation contestants, and get the well known equilibrium where the e¤ort of a contestant equals v=4: More importantly, the following corollaries are immediate and will be used frequently below.
Corollary 1 Consider the symmetric case where a = b = 2 (0; 1) : Here, the e¤ort of a high valuation contestant is
and expected utility of a high valuation contestant is
Corollary 2 Consider the case where 0 < i < 1 but j = 0 (contestant j believes with probability one that his opponent has a high valuation). The expected utility of the high valuation types equals
4 The repeated contest
Updating of beliefs
Before the contestants enter round two, they observe all actions taken in round one and the winner of the contest in round one, and update their beliefs about their rivals'type.
Recall that types are drawn independently. Moreover, the identity of the winner does not carry any additional information about the types once the …rst round e¤orts are known.
Hence, the updated belief i can be regarded as a function of the rivals'…rst round e¤ort
To simplify the exposition, I will impose the following simple reasonable belief re…ne-ment:
This seems reasonable because any x 1 j > 0 is strictly dominated for the low valuation contestant. 8 If we do not impose (5), the set of equilibria is larger, but the additional equilibria di¤er from those that satisfy (5) only o¤ the equilibrium path. 
Separation in round one
Here I look for perfect Bayesian equilibria (henceforth, equilibria) where both contestants "separate" in round one. A contestant i separates in round one i¤
i (0) with probability one. I will call an equilibrium an equilibrium with separation in round one if both contestants separate in round one.
Suppose that both contestants separate in round one. Then we have x Therefore, in an equilibrium with separation in round one,
for i = a; b; j 6 = i: The solution to these problems is
and gives a high valuation contestant u
Now consider the second round. Given beliefs, the optimal behavior of a high valuation type in the second round is easily described:
Expected utility of a high valuation contestant from the second round equals u
. Summing up, we have
Lemma 2
If there is an equilibrium with separation in round one, then strategies in this equilibrium satisfy
(1 )
; if v i = v;
Beliefs in round two are
Expected utility equals
By comparing this lemma with the results of the previous section, we immediately come to the following proposition.
Proposition 1
In an equilibrium with separation in round one, all the actions taken in the …rst round are the same as in a symmetric one shot contest with two sided asymmetric information. All the actions taken in the second round are the same as in the corresponding one shot contests with full information. Expected e¤ort in each round equals the expected e¤ort in a symmetric one shot contest with two sided asymmetric information.
Proof. The equivalence of the actions in round one follows by comparison of the lemma 2 with the corollary 1.
In an equilibrium with separation in round one, all private information is revealed in round one. Hence, in round two the equilibrium actions must be the same as in the corresponding one-shot contests with complete information.
By lemma 2, total expected …rst round e¤ort in an equilibrium with separation in round one equals (1 ) 2 v=2; as in a symmetric one shot contest with two sided asymmetric information. Ex ante expected second round e¤ort of one contestant equals
(With probability ; the contestant has low valuation and chooses zero e¤ort. With the remaining probability 1 he is a high valuation contestant. He chooses " in the second round if his opponent is a low valuation contestant, which happens with probability :
On the other hand, with 1 the opponent is also a high valuation contestant, and both
in the second round.) Therefore, with " ! 0; total expected e¤ort of the second round is (1 ) 2 v=2, too.
The following proposition 2 gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of an equilibrium with separation in round one.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium with separation in round one exists if, and only if,
1=2:
Proof. A low valuation contestant never wants to deviate. A high valuation contestant can neither gain by deviating in round two only, nor by deviating to an x 1 i > 0: Therefore, we only have to check whether a high valuation contestant wants to deviate to
Denote the …rst round payo¤ from the deviation under consideration by u
: Because x 1 i = 0; contestant j thinks i is a low valuation contestant:
Suppose that contestant j has a high valuation. Then he will play x 2 j = " according to the equilibrium strategy. Contestant i 0 s best response to
and
Therefore, if j is a high valuation contestant, deviating gives contestant i a second round utility u 
Contestant i has no incentive to deviate if, and only if, u i u i (dev) ; that is,
This inequality holds if, and only if, 1=2:
As proposition 2 shows, whether an equilibrium with separation in round one exists depends on the fraction of low valuation contestants, but not on the high valuation v:
To gain some intuition, consider the extreme case where = 0: Then both contestants think that their opponent is a high valuation contestant. By behaving according to the strategy described in lemma 2, a high valuation contestant gets twice the payo¤ of a one shot full information contest, that is, u i = v=2: If he deviates to x 1 i = 0; he loses the …rst round with probability 1: On the other hand, he tricks his opponent into believing that he has a low valuation, and therefore wins the second round without any e¤ort. Therefore,
Now consider the case where = 1. Here, both contestants think their opponent has low valuation. By behaving according to the proposed strategy, a high cost contestant gets 2v: If he deviates to x 1 i = 0; he loses in round one with probability 1=2. However, he 10 As shown above, the assumption that x t i 2 X = f0g[["; 1) ensures that there is a best reply to ", i.e. a best reply to the best reply to zero. To ensure the existence of a best reply to the best reply to zero in the alternative approaches discussed in footnote 4 above, one can (i) introduce another e¤ort level 0 ++ ; which is identical to 0 + , except that 0 ++ wins against 0 + : (ii) With an endogenous tie breaking rule, the following stipulation for a tie at x does not gain anything in terms of second round payo¤, because his opponent has a low valuation and will choose zero e¤ort anyway. Therefore, the contestant does not gain by deviating.
Proposition 2 shows that these considerations generalize: an equilibrium with separation in round one exists if, and only if, is not too small. 11 Moreover, it will become clear below that this is the only symmetric equilibrium in this case.
Pooling in round one
A contestant i pools in round one i¤
i (0) with probability one. The following proposition is a negative result, which will turn out to be very useful later on.
Proposition 3
There is (i) no equilibrium where both contestants pool in round one, and (ii) no equilibrium where one contestant pools in round one and the other contestant separates in round one.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is straightforward. Suppose that, contrary to proposition 3, there is an equilibrium where both contestants pool in round one. Then a contestant with a high valuation can win the …rst round by spending only a tiny amount ": The drawback is that, by doing this, the contestant shows that he has a high valuation; however, this is outweighed by the bene…t of winning easily in round one. Thus, each high valuation contestant would like to deviate in round one. The same logic applies also to (ii): if only one contestant pools in round one, and the other contestant separates in round one, then the high valuation type of the separating contestant will spend only " in the …rst round, and hence the pooling contestant can still win the …rst round easily. The pooling contestant would like to deviate here, too.
11 If a contestant cannot win without putting any e¤ort, the incentives to deviate are lower, since he gets a payo¤ of zero from the …rst round if he chooses x 1 i = 0: Therefore, the range of the parameter where an equilibrium with separation in round one exists is bigger. To be more precise, in the same way as in the proof of proposition 2, it can be proved that an equilibrium with separation in round one exists in this case if, and only if, 1=3:
Partial pooling in round one
A contestant i pools partially in round one i¤ i neither pools nor separates in round one.
That is, we have
i (0) with some probability q 2 (0; 1) ; and
with the remaining probability 1 q: An equilibrium with (symmetric) partial pooling in round one is an equilibrium in which both contestants pool partially in round one (with the same probability q).
Clearly, in any equilibrium the low valuation types choose zero e¤ort with probability one. Thus, in any equilibrium with partial pooling in round one, the high valuation types play a nondegenerate mixed strategy which puts some mass on zero e¤ort in the …rst round. With the remaining probability mass they might in principle mix over several positive …rst-round e¤orts. However, given the updating of beliefs according to (5), a contestant cannot in ‡uence the belief of his rival by choosing between di¤erent strictly positive e¤orts in round one. Thus, if a high valuation type chooses a strictly positive e¤ort in round one with a strictly positive probability, this e¤ort must maximize his …rst round payo¤. The …rst round payo¤ is a strictly concave function, whatever the strategy of the opponent may be. Thus it has a unique maximizer. Therefore, in equilibrium high valuation types never mix between di¤erent strictly positive e¤ort levels.
This implies that, in any equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one, the high valuation types mix between zero and a unique strictly positive e¤ort level in round one:
0; with probability q > 0; Thus, the optimal strictly positive …rst round e¤ort of contestant i = a; b (i 6 = j) solves
The …rst order conditions of these problems are
Solving, we get
Since q > 0; this is strictly positive, and hence the constraint
" is not binding.
Lemma 3
If there is an equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one, then strategies in this equilibrium are as follows:
In t=1, a high valuation contestant i chooses x 1 i = 0 with some uniquely de…ned probability q 2 (0; 1), and with the remaining probability (1 q) he chooses x 
where
E¤ort of a high valuation contestant i in t=2 is
Low valuation contestants always choose zero e¤ort.
Proof. Strategies for round one follow from the discussion above. Strategies for round two follow from section 3. Beliefs must be consistent with the strategies; together with (5), this implies equation (7).
The following proposition 4 gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of an equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one exists if, and only if, < 1=2:
To understand the logic behind proposition 4, let me brie ‡y sketch the idea of the proof here. By construction of the strategies, we only have to show that there is a unique If q is (close to) zero, both contestants (almost) separate in round one. If < 1=2; then we know from proposition 2 that there is no equilibrium with separation in round one. That is, contestant i would strictly prefer to play
On the other hand, if q is (close to) one, then both contestants (almost) pool in round one. As we have seen above, there is no equilibrium with pooling in round one, since contestant i would prefer playing some small positive e¤ort over playing x These results indicate that if the fraction of low valuation contestants is low, there is a ratchet e¤ect in repeated contests. High valuation contestants are sometimes sandbagging:
they sometimes choose low e¤ort in order to make the opponent believe that they have a low valuation, which makes the opponent less aggressive in the second round. As the next proposition shows, the overall e¤ect is that total expected e¤ort is decreased.
Proposition 5
In an equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one, expected e¤ort is smaller than in two unconnected one shot contests with two sided asymmetric information.
Expected e¤ort in the …rst round is lower than in a one shot contest for two reasons.
First, the high valuation contestants sometimes choose zero e¤ort. Second, even if they choose a positive e¤ort, it is nevertheless smaller than the e¤ort chosen in a one shot
The reason is that the other contestant chooses zero e¤ort with probability q even if he has a high valuation; hence the marginal bene…t of …rst round e¤ort is lower.
For the second round the comparison is less clear cut. Depending on the e¤orts chosen in round one, e¤ort in round two may be higher or lower than in a one shot contest. For example, if both contestants have a high valuation and both choosex in the …rst round, then they will both choose v=4 in the second round, more than in a one shot contest with asymmetric information. However, if they choose x 1 a = x 1 b = 0, second round e¤orts will be lower:
The reason is that, after observing x 1 i = 0; contestant j = a; b thinks that i 6 = j has a low valuation with higher probability > :
As proposition 5 shows, the overall e¤ect is that expected e¤ort in the repeated contest is unambiguously lower than in two unrelated one shot contests.
Turning to rent dissipation and welfare, it is clear that lower expected e¤ort is bene…cial for the contestants. But there is a countervailing e¤ect: sometimes a low valuation contestant gets the prize in round one, and thus the allocation can be worse than in two unrelated one shot contests. As the following proposition shows, for the contestants the bene…cial e¤ect dominates.
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Proposition 6 Expected utility is higher in the equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one than in two unrelated one shot contests. Thus the repeated contest is better if rent-seeking activities are considered su¢ ciently wasteful. This can be used to lessen the deadweight loss of rent-seeking, e.g. for a monopoly position. Suppose the monopoly is given to one of the rent seekers only for a limited amount of time, and then the question who is going to be the monopolist is opened up again. Although this adds a second rent-seeking contest, the total deadweight loss can be smaller due to sandbagging in the …rst round.
A perfectly discriminating contest
In this section I consider a perfectly discriminating contest and show that, qualitatively, the results are the same as above. In a perfectly discriminating contest (or all pay auction), the contestant who chooses the higher e¤ort wins with probability one:
Like the lottery model (1), the contest success function (9) is frequently used in the literature (see, for example, Baye, Kovenock, deVries 1996 and Konrad 2007).
In perfectly discriminating contests, equilibria are in mixed strategies and involve randomization according to continuous distribution functions over intervalls which have an in…mum of zero. Therefore the assumption that there is a small minimum expenditure requirement " > 0; which proved convenient for the analysis of an imperfectly discriminating contest, needlessly complicates the analysis of the perfectly discriminating contest.
A more reasonable approach, which is sometimes used in auction theory (e.g. Blume and
Heidhues 2006), is to assume that x t i can be any nonnegative real number and to allow two additional e¤ort levels 0 + and 0 ++ : These e¤orts are identical to zero e¤ort except that 0 + wins against 0; and 0 ++ wins against 0 + and against 0. The role of 0 + is similar with the role of " in the analysis above: to ensure existence of a best reply to zero e¤ort in round two. The role of 0 ++ is to ensure existence of optimal actions o¤ the equilibrium path: 0 ++ is the best reply to an e¤ort of 0 + in round two, it corresponds to " + p "v;
which under (1) is the best reply to " in t = 2 (see proof of proposition 2). Both 0 + and 0 ++ have a cost of zero, just as we studied the limit " ! 0 above. The rival can discern e¤orts 0; 0 + ; and 0 ++ : If we used these assumptions together with the contest success function (1), the analysis would proceed exactly as presented above. These additional e¤ort levels are just an innocuous way to deal with di¢ culties caused by the continuous strategy space.
14 14 Blume and Heidhues (2006) introduce 0 + to circumvent the technical problem that there is no smallest real number above 0 and argue that this assumption is inocuous. One can also use the tie breaking rule speci…ed in footnotes 4 and 9 together with (9) . This leads to the same results as the analysis presented which has probability : The expected utility of the high valuation types is u i = u j = i v:
To gain some intuition, note that i can guarantee himself an expected utility of i v by choosing 0 + . Therefore, i will never exert more e¤ort than (1 i ) v: But then the high valuation type of j can guarantee himself an expected utility arbitrarily close to i v by choosing an e¤ort just above (1 i ) v. As usual in perfectly discriminating contest, any rents over and above these lower bounds are dissipated. When does an equilibrium with separation in round one exist? By construction, the only relevant consideration is whether it pays for a high valuation type of i to deviate to believes that i has a low valuation, i.e. j = 1; thus j chooses 0 + ; the best reply of i is 0 ++ and i gets v.
Separation in round one
Therefore, an equilibrium with separation in round 1 exists if, and only if, 2 v ( v=2) + v or 2=3: Hence, qualitatively proposition 2 is robust: an equilibrium with separation in round 1 exists if, and only if, the fraction of low valuation types is su¢ ciently high.
Partial pooling in round one In any equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one, the high valuation types play as follows. In t = 1; they choose 0 with some probability q 2 (0; 1) and randomize uniformly over (0; (1 ) (1 q) v] with the remaining probability 1 q: Thus the distribution of the …rst round e¤ort of a high valuation type is
Suppose contestant j follows this strategy. Then the expected …rst round utility of the high valuation type of i from
Now consider the second period utility from any x and i gets zero. Thus the expected second round utility from a strictly positive …rst round e¤ort is ( + (1 ) q) v = v: Putting things together, the expected utility from
Still assuming j behaves according to (10) , now suppose that i chooses x 
Using (8), it is straightforward to show that equation (11) can not be satis…ed by any
On the other hand, if < 2=3; there is a unique q 2 (0; 1) that solves equation (11), namely
As above, an equilibrium with partial pooling exist if is su¢ ciently small; qualitatively proposition 4 is robust.
The resulting payo¤ in an equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling is v p ( + 2):
Given < 2=3; it is easy to show that this payo¤ is bigger than 2 v; which is the payo¤ in two unrelated one shot contests (or one single contest with a prize of value 2v for the high valuation types). Hence proposition 6 above applies to the perfectly discriminating contest as well.
As in the case of an imperfectly discriminating contest, the allocation of the object is ine¢ cient in an equilibrium with partial pooling, while it is e¢ cient in a one shot contest.
This e¤ect decreases expected utility in the repeated contest. As we have seen, expected equilibrium utility is nevertheless higher. Therefore expected e¤orts must be lower. In other words, proposition 5 and corollary 3 hold, as well.
Conclusion
This paper has made a …rst step towards analyzing repeated contests with asymmetric information. It analyzed a highly stylized model, with two contestants of two types, who play a once repeated contest. The results show that the fraction of low valuation contestants is important. If the a priori probability of meeting a low valuation contestant is high, there will be separation in round one. Equilibrium play will be the same as in one shot contests: in the …rst round, the same as in a one shot contest with asymmetric information, in the second round, the same as in the corresponding one shot contest with complete information. Expected e¤ort and rent dissipation will be the same as in two unrelated one shot contests with asymmetric information. On the other hand, if the a priori probability of meeting a low valuation contestant is low, there is no separation in round one. In this case, contestants with high valuations sometimes mimic the behavior of low valuation types in order to induce their opponents to believe that they don't care all that much about winning. This sandbagging reduces expected e¤ort and rent dissipation.
Future research should go beyond the highly stylized two types, two contestant, two rounds framework analyzed here. When there are more than two contestants, separation in round one is more likely. When an opponent believes that a contestant has a low valuation this is bene…cial for the contestant if, and only if, the opponent also thinks that there is no other high valuation contestant around -but this is less likely if there are many contestants. Thus, a higher number of contestants reduces incentives for sandbagging and thus makes separation in round one more likely.
There are many open questions on repeated contests with asymmetric information.
One important simplifying assumption of the present paper is that the low valuation types have a valuation of zero. This assumption begs several interesting questions. For example, could it be that a low valuation type blu¤s and imitates a high valuation type?
Clearly, this is an important area for future work. In addition, it would be interesting to study the case where only the identity of the winner can be observed, but not the e¤orts chosen.
Appendix
7.1 Proof of proposition 3
(i) There is no equilibrium where both contestants pool in round one. Towards a contradiction, suppose there is an equilibrium where both contestants pool in round one.
This implies
; and i (0) = since no information is revealed.
The payo¤ of a contestant with high valuation is (see corollary 1)
Now consider what happens if a high valuation contestant deviates to x 
Therefore,
It follows that
Therefore, there is no equilibrium where both contestants pool in round one.
(ii) There is no equilibrium where one contestant pools in round one and the other contestant separates in round one. Suppose to the contrary that there is such an equilibrium. Assume without loss of generality that a pools 15 , whereas b separates.
Then we must have x In the second round, a knows the type of b, and we have
(See corollary 2 for the second line.) Expected utility of contestant a therefore equals (if
Now consider what happens if the pooling contestant a deviates to a positivex
The optimal positive e¤ort is the best reply to b 0 s …rst round strategy. Hencẽ
With " ! 0; we getx 
It follows that ; which happens with probability + (1 ) q; we have a symmetric situation in t=2: neither contestant knows the opponents type, and they have beliefs i = j = as de…ned in equation (8) . In that case, the expected payo¤ of i is
On the other hand, if contestant j plays x 1 j =x (this happens with probability (1 ) (1 q));
then we have an asymmetric situation where i = 0 while j = : Then
Putting things together, the expected payo¤ of i if he plays
Now let us determine the payo¤ of i from playing x 1 i =x: In the …rst round, i gets
Turning to the second round, if contestant j plays x 1 j = 0; which happens with probability + (1 ) q; we have an asymmetric situation in t = 2 where j = 0 and i = : In this case,
then we have a = b = 0, and therefore u 
We can establish the following lemma. 
2 : Hence
which is positive for all 2 (0; 1) :
To give an interpretation of these functions, In what follows, I will show that d 1 and d 2 are strictly increasing in q: Di¤erentiating
Substituting equation (8) Di¤erentiating, (iii) Uniqueness. Suppose there are other equilibria with symmetric partial pooling in round one. By lemma 3, these di¤er from the one described above only in the probability q with which a high valuation contestant chooses zero e¤ort in round one, and in the related positive …rst round e¤ortx: However, as we have seen above, there is a unique q that solves d (q) = 0: Thus, the equilibrium is unique in the class of equilibria with symmetric partial pooling in round one.
Proof of proposition 5
Expected e¤orts in the …rst round of the equilibrium with symmetric partial pooling in round one is Putting things together, it follows that the expected e¤ort of a contestant is (each line corresponds to one of the bullet list items above) 
Proof of proposition 6
Clearly, low valuation contestants always get zero utility. Denote the expected utility of a high valuation contestant in two unrelated one shot contests with asymmetric information by u 0 : From corollary one, we have
In the equilibrium with partial pooling in round one, expected utility of a high valuation contestant is given by u i (x) ; see equation (12) . The di¤erence is After substituting from equation (8) 18 + 6 > 0 for all < 1. Hence u i (x) > u 0 for all q 2 (0; 1) ; and thus for the equilibrium q: This completes the proof.
